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Do inventories have an impact on price transmission?  
Evidence from the Canadian chicken industry 
1. Introduction 
The empirical literature on Asymmetric Price Transmission (APT) in agri-food supply chains has 
grown significantly in recent years. This interest in APT appears motivated by concerns relative 
to concentration among input suppliers and downstream processing and retailing firms. Recently, 
McCorriston et al. (2001), Carman and Sexton (2005) and Lloyd et al. (2006) studied empirically 
the linkages between market power and price transmission.1 However, market power is certainly 
not the only cause of APT observed in retail-farm margins. Risk and expectations, innovation, 
menu costs of changing prices, government intervention, changes in consumer preferences, 
perishability of products and inventory management strategies are all factors that can explain 
APT in agri-food supply chains (Wohlgenant, 2001). 
There are formal theoretical arguments that link inventories to price transmission. 
Wohlgenant (1985) proposed a rational expectations model to explain those linkages using a 
profit maximization framework in which a competitive firm maximizes present value of expected 
net revenues from inventory holdings. Deaton and Laroque (1992) analyzed the behaviour of 
commodity prices under storage. They showed that inventory demand is more elastic at lower 
prices. Hence, a shock at higher prices (when inventories are low) triggers a larger price reaction 
in the supply chain than an identical shock when prices are low.  
The Canadian chicken market offers an interesting setting to investigate the influence of 
inventories on price transmission. Canadian chicken producers rely on supply management and 
protection at the border2 to support the farm gate price. In short, output in each province is 
determined using a bottom-up approach through which processors survey market opportunities, 
and relay their demand of live chickens to the producers’ marketing boards in each province. The 
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provincial boards relay their output requirements to Chicken Farmers of Canada (CFC) who then 
adjust provincial market shares to sum to the chicken quota allocation at the national level. 
Between 1992 and 2002, farm prices were determined through negotiations between chicken 
producers’ marketing boards and processors in each province. Since May 2003, the farm price in 
Ontario (generally used as a basis for the price negotiations in the other provinces) is now 
explicitly tied to producers’ average costs. This price mechanism is often referred to as “cost-
plus” pricing. Output restrictions at the farm level combined with predetermined farm prices 
imply a role for inventories in balancing unexpected demand and supply shocks, as well as a 
causality relationship between farm and wholesale prices.  
Deaton and Laroque (1992)’s argument can easily be transposed to the Canadian chicken 
supply chain. Suppose there is an increase in the cost structure of producers which moves the 
farm supply inward and thus raises the farm price. As a result, the processors’ supply curve will 
also shift inward. The magnitude of the impact on the wholesale price following the shock at the 
farm level however will depend on the demand’s elasticity. Consider a situation in which 
inventories are low (high wholesale price) and thus the use plus storage demand is inelastic. The 
shock on the farm price will cause the wholesale price to increase by a greater percentage than 
when inventories are large (and thus use plus storage demand will be made more elastic). As a 
result, one is likely to witness a larger (smaller) response in the wholesale price following a 
change in the farm price if inventories are below (above) the target level.  
Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) divide up APT into two broad categories3: 
magnitude and speed. APT in magnitude refers to the response in the output price made 
conditional on the direction of the change in the input price. APT in speed refers to the pace of 
the response in the output price made conditional on the direction of the change in the input 
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price. It is fair to say that a significant share of APT studies in the literature focus on the latter 
type of asymmetry (e.g., Goodwin and Holt, 1999; Abdulai, 2002; Serra and Goodwin, 2003; 
Chavas and Mehta, 2004; Ben-Kaabia and Gil, 2007). In general, these studies rely on some 
form of threshold behaviour to account for the different speed to which prices return to their 
long-run equilibrium. The literature on asymmetry in the magnitude of price transmission is 
thinner. Miller and Hayenga (2001) investigated APT in the U.S. hog/pork industry by dividing 
the observations into low and high frequency price cycles. They subsequently uncovered APT in 
the time domain. Lass (2005) used linear methods (in the spirit of Houck, 1977; and Ward, 1982) 
applied to non-linear transformations of integrated variables to test for APT in the U.S. dairy 
industry. Llyod et al. (2006) investigated APT in the U.K. cattle/beef supply chain and Gervais 
(2010) examined potential non-linearities in both the speed and magnitude of price transmission 
in the U.S. hog/pork supply chain.   
This paper proposes to analyze APT using an empirical framework based on insights 
from the macroeconomics literature on Linear-Quadratic (LQ) inventory models (e.g., 
Blanchard, 1983; West, 1995; and Hamilton, 2002). Usually, inventories are used to smooth 
unanticipated fluctuations in demand and prevent stocking out. LQ inventory models assume that 
inventory costs are a quadratic function of the difference between the end-of-period inventories 
and a target inventory. The latter is generally specified as a linear function of the current period’s 
sales. While some studies4 explicitly identified inventories as a potential source of asymmetry in 
price transmission, Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) note that no studies ever 
documented quantitatively the impact of inventories on the degree of APT. Abbassi and Gervais 
(2010) provided structural estimates of a linear-quadratic inventory model in the context of an 
agri-food supply chain, but they do not address price transmission in the supply chain. The 
 4 
purpose of the paper is to fill this gap in the literature by investigating empirically the impacts of 
inventories on price transmission.  
The empirical relationship between price transmission and inventories is partly based on 
Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997) and Borenstein and Shepard (2002) who investigated 
price transmission between crude oil and gasoline markets. The arguments of the former study 
slightly depart from the LQ inventory models because the authors essentially rely on some form 
of cost asymmetry when changing inventories. Inventories must be nonnegative and thus they 
argue that the cost of decreasing inventories must increase substantially at some point. In other 
words, the expected costs of stocking-out must be greater than costs of building-up inventories. 
Borenstein and Shepard (2002) focus on the existence of adjustment costs in production to 
explain why firms spread adjustments in output over time.   
  The empirical strategy consists of two distinct steps. First, the flexible non-linear 
framework of Hamilton (2001, 2003) is used to investigate the influence of inventories on price 
transmission. The procedure detects significant non-linearities and suggests that the price 
transmission elasticity is increasing in the level of the farm price and decreasing in the ratio of 
inventories to sales. This evidence leads to specific functional forms for the price transmission 
and target inventory equations which are estimated in a second step. The estimation procedure 
accounts for potential simultaneity between sales at the wholesale level and the wholesale price. 
Our results suggest that price transmission is lower (higher) when inventories are below (above) 
a target which is function of domestic sales. 
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2. Data 
Our study involves analysing wholesale-farm price spread.5 Data on monthly chicken farm prices 
in Ontario from April 1992 to November 2003 were obtained from Chicken Farmers of Canada 
(CFC). CFC also supplied a weighted average of monthly wholesale prices in Ontario based on 
different chicken cuts. Figure 1 presents the pattern of the farm and wholesale prices in Ontario. 
The wholesale price is more volatile than the farm price (on an eviscerated basis). This is 
consistent with an objective of supply management which is to stabilize farm receipts. A 
preliminary investigation of the potential correlation between the two prices is provided in figure 
2. It illustrates the relationship between the natural log of the farm price and the natural log of 
the price received by processing firms. There is an apparent positive correlation between the two 
prices although the coefficient of determination ( )2R  of a linear regression is not especially high 
at 0.46.  
 Data on monthly inventories and chicken production in the province of Ontario from 
April 1992 to November 2003 were also obtained from CFC. Domestic sales were proxied by the 
current period output minus the difference in the end-of-period inventory level of the current and 
previous periods.6 Figure 3 illustrates the growth in domestic sales of chicken meat accompanied 
by the proportional growth in inventories of chicken products. Figure 4 details the correlation 
between monthly inventories and domestic sales. The positive linear relationship is more 
significant than for the price relationship as the coefficient of determination is 0.76.     
Before estimating the relationship between wholesale and farm prices, the stochastic 
properties of the data need to be investigated. The residual-based stationary bootstrap procedure 
of Parker, Paparoditis and Politis (2006) is used to investigate if the series are integrated of order 
one. The procedure has overwhelmingly better power in small samples than the usual asymptotic 
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tests which tend to under reject the null hypothesis of a unit root (Maddala and Kim, 1998). 
Consider a time series Xt and define the (centered) residuals 1ˆˆt t tv X Xρ −= −  where ρˆ  is the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate of the model: 1t t tX X vρ −= + . The idea is to sample 
from blocks of residuals whose length is randomly selected using a geometric distribution with 
parameter q. A bootstrap sample is formed by setting the first observation of the bootstrap 
sample to its sample value ( )*1 1X X= . The second observation in the bootstrap sample is: 
* * *
2 1 2X X v= + ; where 
*
2 ˆtv v=  is randomly selected. The following observation is: * * *3 2 3X X v= + ; 
where *3 1ˆtv v +=  with probability 1 q−  or * * *3 2 sX X v= +  1, ,s T= K  with probability q.  
The sample simulated with the above procedure mimics the original series and is 
consistent with the null hypothesis of a unit root. Using the bootstrap sample, the OLS estimate 
*ρˆ  is computed. This procedure is repeated B times and the empirical rejection probabilities can 
be computed. In practice, there is no widely accepted process to select the parameter of the 
geometric distribution. We experimented with a few different parameters to find it did not 
change the qualitative nature of the results and chose to report the results for 0.1q =  with 2,000 
repetitions. As for the usual asymptotic unit root tests, there is no a priori agreed procedure to 
decide if the OLS regression should include a drift. Hence, table 1 reports the p-value of the null 
hypothesis of a unit root with and without a drift included in the bootstrap regression.  
Figure 3 strongly suggests that a drift variable should be included for the sales and 
inventory variables because both variables are trending upward. The null hypothesis of a unit 
root is strongly rejected when a drift variable is included. Visual inspection of the farm and 
wholesale price series in Figure 1 does not produce undisputable evidence for or against the 
inclusion of a drift in the unit root test. The regression including a drift variable produces a p-
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value for the drift variable lower than 0.1. Hence, if one considers that both variables have a 
deterministic drift under the null hypothesis, the hypothesis that both variables are integrated of 
order one is clearly rejected in Table 1. The null hypothesis of a unit root without a drift is also 
rejected at the 10% significance level for the wholesale price. The p-value for the farm price 
when there is no drift in the equation is however greater than acceptable significance levels. 
Based on the reported evidence, the analysis in the next section assumes that the variables are 
stationary. 
  
3. A Preliminary investigation of potential non-linearities in price transmission 
Let tP  and tF  denote the wholesale and farm prices respectively at period t ( )1, ,t T= K . The 
variables 1tH −  and tS  represent the end-of-period 1t −  inventory level and sales in period t, 
respectively. Let lower-case letters denote the logarithmic transformation of the variables. In the 
spirit of linear-quadratic inventory models (e.g., West, 1995), we assume that inventory costs are 
increasing in the difference between the end-of-period inventories and a target inventory which 
is a linear function of the current period’s sales, e.g. 0 1 tSγ γ+ . The parameters 1γ  and 0γ  
represent, respectively, the conditional and unconditional components of the target inventory 
equation. 
Consider first a iso-elastic price transmission equation: ( )1 2 1 0 1t tH St tP AF
α α γ γ
−
+ − −
= , where 
0A >  is a constant. Taking a logarithmic transformation on both sides of the equation yields the 
reduced form price transmission equation:   
( )0 1 2 1 0 1t t t t tp f f H Sα α α γ γ−= + + − −  (1) 
where 0 ln Aα ≡ . Given marketing institutions in the Canadian chicken industry, the farm price 
in period t is predetermined given producers and processors bargain over the price about two 
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periods before the marketing period actually starts. The inventory accumulation equation is 
1t t t tH Q H S−= + −  where Qt represents industry’s output. The end-of-period inventory is also 
predetermined at time t. Because industry output is determined before actual marketing decisions 
are made, the variable Qt is also pre-determined from a time t perspective. However the demand 
for inventories and sales in period t may be determined jointly with the wholesale price. The 
existence of significant barriers to trade for chicken products in Canada implies that the 
wholesale price is determined by domestic market conditions and thus there exists a simultaneity 
issue in (1). One option to resolve the simultaneity issue would be to omit sales from (1), and 
thus assume that 1 0γ = . The inventory target would then simply be a constant. Annual per capita 
consumption of chicken meat in Canada went from 22.3 kg in 1992 to 30.0 kg in 2003 
(Agriculture and Agri-food Canada, AAFC). An increase in inventories is thus to be expected if 
they are used to smooth out fluctuations in demand, or prevent stocking-out when the overall 
demand for chicken products is increasing. Moreover, sales and inventories clearly trend together 
in Figure 3. Failing to account for this correlation between inventories and demand could bias the 
relationship between price transmission and inventories.  
 As usual when trying to model non-linearity, the challenge is to capture the precise nature 
of the non-linearity without over-fitting the data. The iso-elastic functional form behind (1) is 
one of many possible relationships between prices, sales and inventories. The first step will thus 
involve investigating potential non-linearities in price transmission using Hamilton (2001, 
2003)’s flexible nonlinear inference framework.   
Hamilton’s procedure entails estimating a nonlinear regression model of the form: 
( )t t ty µ ε= +z ; where ty  is the dependent variable, tz  is a vector of independent variables of 
dimension T k×  and tε  is a normally distributed random error term with zero mean and variance 
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2σ . The empirical strategy is to view the function ( )tµ z
 
as the outcome of random fields. For a 
given non-stochastic vector z , the function ( )µ z  is assumed to be normally distributed with 
mean 0 1 tδ +δ z  and variance 2λ . The regression equation reduces to a standard linear regression 
( )0 1t t ty δ δ ε= + +z  when the variance of the random field is zero. Conversely, the price 
transmission equation can substantially deviate from a linear regression model if the value of λ  
is large. 
The estimation of the random fields proceeds through an algorithm to search over the 
parameters that characterize the variability of the function ( )µ z . Hamilton (2001) assumes that 
two random realizations, 1z  and 2z , are uncorrelated if they are sufficiently far apart. 
Specifically, the correlation is zero when ( )( )0.522 1 210.5 1k j j jj g z z= − >∑ , where the parameters  
1 j kg g g =  g K K  govern the variability of the nonlinear function as the z  vary. The 
flexibility of the approach comes from the previous functional form assumed to guide the 
variability of the random field. In the present case, the regression equation can be rewritten as: 
 ( )0 1t t t ty mδ λ ε= + + +δ z gz  (2) 
where ( )m ⋅  is the stochastic process that characterizes the conditional expectation. The 
parameters in (2) are estimated with maximum likelihood techniques. The non-negligible 
advantage of the flexible non-linear framework is that it allows for a direct test of the null 
hypothesis that the relation between z  and y  is linear. This amounts to testing whether 2λ  is 
different from zero with a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test holding the coefficients in g at a value 
proportional to their standard deviation.   
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Given that instrumental variable estimation techniques have yet to be developed for 
flexible non-linear models, we use the ratio of inventories to sales ( )1t tH S−  as an independent 
variable7 in the price transmission equation to lessen the potential correlation between sales and 
the error term. The dependent variable will be logarithmic transformation of the wholesale price 
( )tp  and [ ]1t t t tf H S−≡z . 
The estimates of the model are derived from the maximization of a log-likelihood 
function and the standard errors are the usual asymptotic estimates. They are reported in the 
second column of Table 2. Note that the error term is standardized such that λ σ ω≡ ⋅ . The chi-
squared version of the LM non-linearity test is used because it has good properties in small 
samples (Hamilton, 2001). The null hypothesis of a linear model is soundly rejected. The test 
statistic is 78.06 and is larger than the chi-squared statistic with one degree of freedom (p-value 
less than 0.001).  
The parameters of the linear component in (2) are statistically significant. To offer a 
comparison between the Hamilton framework and a standard linear model of price transmission 
with tf  and 1t tH S−  as independent variables, Table 2 also reports the OLS estimates of a linear 
model. The price transmission elasticity of the strictly linear model is 1.062. The coefficient of 
the farm price in the linear component of (2) is higher, but also has a large standard error. The 
coefficients for the ratio of inventories to domestic sales in the linear component of (2) and the 
linear price transmission equation are of similar magnitude and economic interpretation. More 
importantly, the parameters of the non-linear component in (2) and the estimate of σ  and ω  are 
quite large compared to their standard error, thus indicating a statistically significant form of 
non-linearity in price transmission. While the statistical evidence about non-linearity is quite 
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strong, it is difficult to gauge the nature of this non-linearity simply by analyzing the coefficients 
in Table 2.  
To characterize the non-linearity in the price transmission model, Figure 5 plots the 
natural log of the predicted wholesale price as function of the natural log of the farm price for 
three different values of the ratio of inventories to domestic sales (the sample average and the 
sample average plus/minus twice the standard error of the ratio). The first thing to note is that a 
constant price transmission elasticity (given the ratio of inventories to domestic sales) is clearly 
rejected by the non-linear framework. The price transmission elasticity is almost everywhere 
increasing in the level of the farm price. Moreover, the lower is the ratio of inventories to 
domestic sales, the higher is the price transmission elasticity, ceteris paribus. Figure 5 suggests a 
specific functional form for price transmission which will be investigated in the next section. 
 
4. Investigating the price transmission elasticity 
The evidence in the previous section is indicative of non-linearity, but it would be nice to have a 
more precise idea of the influence of inventories on price transmission. This could be achieved, 
for example, if more specific assumptions with respect to inventory behaviour are introduced in 
the model. One set of assumptions involves the target inventory equation discussed at the 
beginning of the previous section.  
Assuming that 1 0 1t tH Sγ γ− = + , the evidence in Figure 5 suggests a functional form for 
the price transmission equation resembling a semi-logarithmic form: 
( ){ }0 1 2 1 0 1expt t t t tP F f H Sα α α γ γ−= + + − − . Recalling that a lower-case letter denotes the 
logarithmic transformation of a variable, the price transmission equation can be rewritten as:  
( )0 1 2 1 0 1t t t t t tp F f H S uα α α γ γ−= + + − − +  (3) 
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where tu  is a random error term with mean zero and constant variance. 
 The coefficient 1α  measures the direct impact of the farm price on the percentage change 
in the wholesale price, not accounting for the potential influence of inventories. The coefficient 
2α  measures the combined impact of inventories and a percentage change in the farm price on 
the percentage change in the wholesale price. 
The price transmission elasticity in (3) is:  
( ) ( )1 2 1 0 1t t t t t tp F F F H Sη α α γ γ−≡ ∂ ∂ = + − −  (4) 
It is clear in (4) that η  is: i) a linearly increasing function of the farm price; and ii) that 
deviations between inventories and the target level only have an impact on the intercept of the 
price transmission equation. These two observations are consistent with the evidence presented 
in Figure 5. However, estimating (3) poses a challenge for inference because of potential 
collinearity between the farm price and the logarithmic transformation of the farm price. 
As mentioned in the preceding section, there is a potential correlation between tS  and tu  
and thus equation (3) is estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure. 
It entails setting the sample moment conditions of the model as close to zero as possible using a 
quadratic loss function defined by the product of the sample moment conditions and a weighting 
matrix. In the present case, the weighting matrix is obtained using the residuals of the Nonlinear 
3 Stage Least Squares (N3SLS) matrix with a Bartlett kernel with the truncation parameter of the 
bandwidth selected according to the formula ( )2 94 100l T= . There is very little guidance in the 
GMM literature to select the instruments in finite samples, but it is known that asymptotic 
efficiency may be inversely related to the number of instruments (Imbens, 1997). Hence, the 
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instruments will be sales lagged one and two periods and the farm price as well as its logarithmic 
transformation.8 
Table 3 presents the GMM estimates of the price transmission equation in (3). All the 
estimated coefficients are statistically different than zero. Because there are more instruments 
than sample moment conditions in the model, the GMM approach can use over-identifying 
restrictions to test the consistency of the GMM estimator. The J-test for over-identifying 
restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified. The test 
statistic (7.01) is below the critical value (with three degrees of freedom) at the 5 percent 
significance level.9 
The estimate of 1α  is 0.758 and significantly different than zero at the 5 percent 
significance level. The estimate of 2α  is 0.049 and significant at the 5 percent level. The sign of 
the coefficient 2α  suggests that inventories above the target level will increase the magnitude of 
price transmission. The estimate of the target inventory ( )1γ  is 72 percent of domestic sales.  
When lagged inventories and sales are evaluated at their sample mean, the price 
transmission elasticity is 1.21 (with standard error 0.12). Figure 6 presents the pattern of price 
transmission elasticities for the non-linear structural model in (3) and the log-linear model of 
price transmission. It is quite clear that the log-linear model under-estimates the price 
transmission elasticity between the wholesale and farm prices when compared to the non-linear 
model. Over the entire sample, the price transmission elasticity under the semi-log is smaller 
than the point estimate of the constant elasticity model in only 18 percent of cases.   
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6. Concluding remarks 
Increased concentration in agri-food supply chains combined with recent advances in time series 
econometrics has stimulated significant research efforts to detect asymmetric price transmission 
in agri-food supply chains. This paper contributes to the literature on asymmetric price 
transmission by investigating the influence of inventories in explaining non-linearities in the 
relationship between farm and wholesale prices. Marketing mechanisms and the existence of 
production quotas at the farm level in the Canadian chicken industry imply the farm price and 
output at the farm level are determined before domestic demand is known. Hence, there is a role 
for inventories in smoothing the impacts of unanticipated shocks in demand and supply.  
 Most of the empirical literature on price transmission analyzes asymmetry in the speed of 
transmission. Generally, a negative or positive price shock at one level of the supply chain will 
cause a proportional price change in the upstream and/or downstream markets, but the 
equilibrium will be reached at a different pace depending on whether the shock is positive or 
negative. Conversely, the idea in this paper is that the relationship between prices may be 
conditional on other factors. Borrowing from the macroeconomics literature on linear-quadratic 
inventory models, we specified a price transmission equation between farm and wholesale prices 
which is function of deviations between actual inventories and a target inventory. The flexible 
non-linear inference framework of Hamilton (2001, 2003) is used to investigate potential non-
linearities. The procedure suggests that the price transmission elasticity is increasing in the farm 
price and decreasing in the ratio of inventories to sales.  
The flexible inference framework suggests that the price transmission elasticity is an 
increasing function of the farm price and is also function of inventories. We propose a semi-log 
equation to investigate further the role of inventories on price transmission. We implement a 
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GMM procedure to account for potential correlation between domestic sales and the wholesale 
price.  We found that price transmission is lower (higher) when inventories are below (above) a 
target which is function of domestic sales.   
 While non-linear econometric tools have been successful in pointing out potential 
asymmetries in price transmission, the usefulness of these models is limited for policy purposes 
because they do not identify the source of asymmetry. Future research endeavours in price 
transmission should focus on the estimation of structural models. Policy makers need to have a 
better idea of the impacts of menu costs of changing prices, non-competitive behaviour, 
inventory costs, etc. on price transmission to evaluate whether policy should be used to correct 
potential market failures.   
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Figure 1. Monthly farm and wholesale prices in Ontario, April-1992 to Nov-2003. 
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Figure 2. Correlation between Ontario farm and wholesale prices, April-1992 to Nov-2003. 
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Figure 3. Monthly sales and lagged inventories, April-1992 to Nov-2003. 
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Figure 4. Correlation between sales and lagged inventories, April-1992 to Nov-2003. 
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Figure 5. Predicted price transmission elasticities conditional on  
different ratios of inventories to sales 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Predicted price transmission elasticities of the  
non-linear, log-linear and threshold models 
 22 
 
 
Table 1. Unit root bootstrap results 
 
 
 p-value for the null hypothesis  
of a unit root 
Variables  with drift  without drift 
   Farm price  0.012  0.229 
   Wholesale price  0.001  0.085 
   Inventories  0.009  0.347   
   Sales  0.000  0.033 
Note: The natural logarithmic transformation of the prices was used. 
The drift for the farm price was significant at 6% 
 
Table 2. Estimates of the price transmission equation  
using Hamilton flexible inference framework and a OLS estimator 
  
Hamilton – non-linear model  OLS – linear model 
Variables  Estimate  p-value  Estimate  p-value 
Linear component         
   Constant  0.405 
(0.157) 
 0.005  0.479 
(0.053) 
 0.000 
   Farm price  1.220 
(0.304) 
 0.000  1.062 
(0.092) 
 0.000 
   Ratio inventories / sales  -0.503 
(0.123) 
 0.000  -0.432 
(0.063) 
 0.000 
Non-linear component         
   Farm price  3.085 
(1.916) 
 0.054     
   Ratio inventories / sales  0.978 
(0.314) 
 0.001     
σ
 
 
0.046 
(0.003) 
 0.000     
ω
 
 17.01 
(3.650) 
 0.000     
Note: The adjusted coefficient of determination for the OLS regression ( )2R  is 0.596. 
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Table 3. GMM estimates of the price transmission model  
 
Parameters 
 
Estimate 
(standard error) 
 
 
p-value 
0α   -0.410 
(0.123) 
 0.001 
1α   0.758  
(0.077) 
 0.000 
2α   0.049 
(0.022) 
 0.016 
0γ
 
 -14.670 
(1.696) 
 0.000 
1γ   0.720 
(0.035) 
 0.000 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 Several theoretical studies (e.g. Borenstein et al., 1997; Azzam, 1999; Xia, 2009) highlight the role of imperfect 
competition in markets on asymmetric price transmission.  
 
2
 The literature on supply management in the chicken industry generally focused on analyzing either the economic 
performance of domestic marketing institutions (e.g., Fulton and Tang, 1999; Gervais and Devadoss, 2006; Gervais, 
Guillemette and Romain, 2007) or the competitiveness of the industry under broad globalization pressures (e.g., 
Huff, Meilke, and Amedei, 2000; Rude and Gervais, 2006).  
 
3
 Frey and Manera (2007) provide a more detailed categorization of asymmetric price transmission by focusing on 
the properties of the empirical models used to reveal asymmetry.  
 
4
 Miller and Hayenga (2001) appeal to the existence of menu costs and asymmetric inventory adjustment costs to 
explain changes in firms’ pricing strategies; but never formally introduced inventories in the price transmission 
relationship. Other studies that appeal to inventories to explain APT without explicitly accounting for them include 
Kinnucan and Forker (1987), von Cramon-Taubadel (2001), Abdulai (2002).  
 
5
 Processors play an important role in the management of chicken inventories given the institutional features of the 
Canadian poultry supply chain. As such, they are likely to have a significant impact on APT through the inventory 
channel. In addition, Gervais and Devadoss (2006) showed that chicken processors had greater bargaining power 
than chicken producers. Recently, Xia (2009) extended the analysis of Azzam (1999) and Fousekis (2008) to study 
asymmetries in the magnitude of price transmission. Xia (2009) found that asymmetries in the magnitude of 
wholesale-farm margins can be jointly due to buyer power in the farm market and the curvature of the farm supply. 
 
6
 Domestic sales do not account for imports because monthly import data is thought to be unreliable. Trade of 
chicken products is controlled by a Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) that sets a minimal (zero for U.S. products) tariff on 
imports below the minimum access commitment (currently set at 7.5% of the previous year’s production) and a very 
large (prohibitive) tariff on imports exceeding the minimum access commitment. Because the TRQ acts as a de facto 
import quota, the demand schedule that domestic processors face is the residual demand schedule once within-quota 
imports are accounted for.   
 
7
 Note that in the context of the linear-quadratic inventory model, this ratio is consistent with the parameter 0γ  
constrained to zero.  
 
8
 Endogeneity between sales, inventories and margins is well known (e.g. Kesavan, Gaur, and Raman, 2010). And 
because of the institutional framework of the chicken industry we expect a one period lagged end-of inventory to 
also be endogenous because of high serial correlation with current inventories. It prevents us to consider the one 
lagged value of inventories as exogenous. 
 
9
 The degrees of freedom equal number of equations × number of instruments - number of parameters in the system. 
It must be noted however that the J-test can have low power in small samples (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). 
